A m u l t i n a t i o n a l s e e k i n g i n v a i n a u n i o n as a counterpait in bargaining; another multinational expelling union representátivés from the finn; companies with good and bad labour relations; small and medium-size firms with no unions at all-all these may be found in news items, case-studies and episodes from the near pást of labour relations in transformation and development in the post-socialist countries. After five to six years of the political, social and economic transformation can we already speak about a new system in the field of labour relations, or is it still in transformation? Is the experience of this half-decade sufficient to identify the features of the new emerging system with any of the already known pattems of labour relations?
related to the practice of the farmer, gradually reformed system. Experience, traditions, social relations and networks accumulated from the 1970s onward can be found behind the peaceful character of the political and economic transformation in Hungary, and the same factors can explain the continuity of certain practices in the íield of interest representation and bargaining as well as the survival of mistrust by different social and political actors towards the institutions of the labour relations system.
Actors and institutions o f labour relations in Hungary
The actors and institutions of labour relations were created in the very complex process of transformation to a markét economy, to plurálist parliamentary democracy, and to privatisation of public property through intensive legislation since 1988 in Hungary (Transformation of Public Enterprises-1988 , Strike Law-1989 , Employment Law-1991 , new Labour Code-1992 , Bankruptcy Law-1992 , Law on Privatisation-1992 , Social Act-1993 .
C iovO The laws on the transformation of former state-owned enterprises intő limited liability or joint-stock companies, as well as the law on privatisation, created employers as an independent social and economic actor (le patronat). As the economic transformation and privatisation is a rather complex process consisting of the transformation of state-owned enterprises and the creation of priváté enterprises through investment by foreign companies as well as the emerging national bourgeoisie, the employers do nőt form a homogeneous group. Their stratification and the interrelations of their representative organisations in tűm exert their influence on Hungárián labour relations.
As to the other social partner, the new labour legislation protects the right of free employee association and the right of trade unions. The new political system and labour legislation transformed the unified monolithic structure of unionism intő a plurálist one. In Hungary new independent unions were formed since 1987-88, l mostly in the academic community, bút in a few larger enterprises as well. These new unions at the beginning took a strong political role, opposing the still existing party-state and the monopoly of the former unions. These latter, however, were already starting their transformation intő federalist, more democratic structures and had broken their dependence on the Communist Party.
The other laws on employment, on strikes and the Labour Code set up the rules of negotiations and the solutions of labour conflicts. On the one hand, the new legislation is favourable fór the employees as it guarantees unión rights and representation and institutionalises collective action. On the other hand, employment is nőt protected any longer. Rationalisation and restructuring of firms, together with privatisation, are considered more important political and economic targets that are nőt compatible with the political commitment to full employment, with the former constitutionally guaranteed right to work. Labour lawyers critical of new legislation called attention to the fact that 'social and economic issues have been included in the constitution in a much less considered and elaborate way than the political ones...labour issues were i considered as side issues by the leading political forces of transition ' (Kollonay &[ Ladó, 1992, p. 23 ).
The liberal ideology of economic deregulation and social transformation, the moves ( towards a free markét economy and the new emerging priváté employers are often > opposed to the strong influence of the trade unions. At the same time, however, the new political system needed social institutions to legitimate the transformation, fór the stabilisation of society, fór the control of social conflicts and to negotiate about the social costs of the fundamental changes. (In 1990 , when the Hungárián capital was paralysed by a blockage of taxi and truck drivers protesting against the radical rise of fuel prices, the conflict was negotiated and settled within the National Council fór the Reconciliation of Interests (NCRI) established already in 1988. This was the first time after the political tűm that an institution of labour relations demonstrated its social and political utility fór the new political forces through its capacity to deliver a nationwide agreement.)
Actors and strategies
The new social partners and their strategies have been undergoing significant changes since the beginning of the transformation.
The state remained the most important actor in the field of labour relations by its role as employer and by its political role. By this latter role the state is responsible
• fór labour legislation and fór supervision of its implementation, • fór the creation and maintenance of employment services, • fór participation in trinartite negotiations with the trade unión confederations and employers associations. This tripartite body, already created before the political transformation, aimed at developing social dialogue and sharing the responsibility fór decisions in the worsening economic conditions of the 1980s. The tripartite national-level negotiations in the NCRI later helped to work out and stabilisé the basic rules, principles and standard regulations of Hungárián labour relations.
The state, through its intervention in economic processes like investment, privatisation and monetary policy, has a decisive influence on the labour markét, on employment and working conditions. Since 1993 in Hungary wage policy has nőt been centralised and wages are open to agreement between employees and employers. Only minimum wages are settled by joint agreements in the National Council fór Reconciliation of Interests. However, the state has no means to ensure that these agreements are respected. As employer the state owns a gradually diminishing number of firms in the economy, so the number of employees in public firms is decreasing. More than half of employment is already in the priváté sector. (Estimádon of such sectoral distribution of employment is rather difficult owing to the large proportion of mixed property.) The state still is the largest employer and its role is especially important in the largest industrial firms, in public administration, transport, fináncé, education, health and other social services.
In the branches where the state is the main or only employer the trade unions are traditionally strongest. Consequently, in these fields the state as employer is under strong unión pressure. In Hungary, where strike activity remained rather low compared with the other Central East European countries, the most important strikes were Source: 'Ha m ár elhallgat a csend '. Heti Világgazdaság, 24 February 1994. organised in the state-owned branches like rail transport, the energy sector and education (Table 1) . (Evén in the police and the military the govemment as employer has been threatened by the respective trade unions with waming strikes.) The representation of employegs within the system of labour relations is undergoing significant changes.Tts polarised characlcr. has become Consolidated, although immediately after the political tűm the trade union movement had a fragmented character, a great number of smaller and larger new unions and federations were formed, and their relations were rather conflictual. At national level the main aims of rivalries were fór political influence and redistribution of the former unions' huge assets. A slow crystallisation and concentration of the trade union movement reduced the number of union confederations to the following six by 1993:
• MSZOSZ (National Association of Hungárián Trade Unions), the successor to the former unified trade union, which in its present form of organisation as a federation of branch unions has existed since 1988.
• ASZOK (Confederation of Autonomous Trade Unions), the successor to a few influential former branch unions like those in the chemical, pharmaceutical and a part of the railway sectors.
• LIGA (Democratic League of Independent Trade Unions), the first genuinely independent union confederation bőm as part of the political opposition to the party-state at the end of the 1980s.
• MOSZ (National Alliance of Workers Councils), another new and independent trade union centre, created in certain industrial plants by skilled and militant workers with a strong nostalgia fór the self-goveming bodies of industrial organisations.
• SZÉF (Cooperation Fórum of Trade Unions), the most influential branch organis ation in public administration and in the service sector.
• ÉSZT (Intellectual Workers Trade Union Association), a relatively small union centre comprising somé organisations in education and research.
In the new conditions almost all union centres were facing internál and external legitimacy problems at the beginning of the 1990s. The almost 100% membership of employees in unions in the period after World W ar II has diminished to ca. 30% in most of the Central East European countries. This rate can still be considered high in comparison with the most developed industrial (OECD) countries. In Hungary the average membership of all the union centres seems to be stabilised around one-third of the active wage-eamers. This radical decrease in unión density rate can be explained by several factors:
• Employment has been reduced dramatically; more than one-third of the jobs existing in the laté 1980s were destroyed in the few years of the 'transformation crisis'. Inactivity and unemployment are radically reducing the possible social space fór traditional unión activities.
• The manufacturing sectors as core fields fór unión activities are losing importance in employment.
• The decentralisation of the organisational structure of the economy has alsó had an impact on the sphere open to unions. The proportion of micro organisations and family enterprises without unions has increased substantially in a very few years.
In the 1980s only 4-5% of active wage eamers worked in individual or family business organisations. In 1993 this had increased to 21% (Laky, 1994, p. 74 ).
• The increased political and ideological rivalry at the beginning of the 1990s among the trade unión confederations disillusioned and alienated employees. On the firm level one-time and possible members of the unions were less interested in this rivalry and often missed the appropriate unión support in the everyday problems related to privatisation, restructuring and the reduction of employment.
• The deep cuts in the social infrastructure of firms, run by the unions, diminished the advantages of unión membership.
• The spread of new managerial techniques and the implementation of the 'leading edge' practice of Humán Resource Management (especially at the multinational companies) opened direct dialogue-without unión presence-between employers and rank-and-file people. Individual working contracts have alsó weakened the influence of unions on interest representation.
The successor unión centres-mainly MSZOSZ-were under strong political pressure nőt only from the newly emerging autonomous unions bút alsó from the new political and govemment forces. Their credibility as autonomous new organisations to represent employee interests was questioned at different political forums-even by parliamentary forces-because of their former subordinated role to the communist party. This political rivalry on the national level, seeking political legitimacy, often distracted the forces of the federation from employment-related issues. MSZOSZ lost a considerable part of its membership owing to the pluralisation and transformation of labour relations, bút it continued to have the largest number of members.
The new autonomous trade unions bőm in the political battles of the laté 1980s faced a different type of legitimacy deficiency. They had no organisational roots in the world of work, which was reflected in the low level of membership. This has placed a questionmark against their representativeness vis-á-vis govemment during national-level consultations. After the establishment of the new political institutions of plurálist political democracy, these unions were forced to leam the 'profession of unionism' and to leave the political aréna to the new parties. (Many activists have left the new unions and become important figures in the new political parties.)
After the political transformation, the representativeness of the trade unions was tested several times. These tests were decisive even fór the redistribution of trade unión assets (i.e. reál estate, companies, publishing houses, schools, resorts and sports centres). As the unión confederations could nőt settle the conflict about distribution of unión assets among themselves, the govemment took the initiative. Union members were required to renew their membership in 1992 if they wished it to continue. The result of this test did nőt modify the membership distribution and MSZOSZ maintained its majority.
The second test was organised together with the elections fór self-goveming bodies of the Health and Pension Insurance schemes. In Hungary these two big social security funds have been run by tripartite bodies since 1993. Employees are represented by delegates of the unions in the six unión centres. Their first election was organised together with the first Works Council elections. The results of these elections were expected to be the guidelines fór the provisional redistribution of unión assets (fór the detailed result see the Appendix). MSZOSZ reinforced its political and organisational legitimacy during these elections. It obtained 72% in the Works Council elections, 50% of the seats on the employees' side of the Pension Insurance Body and 45% of the employees' side in the Health Insurance Body. In 1995 the second Works Council elections only slightly modified the above proportions, which remained the definitive ratio fór redistributing the former unión assets.
The successful transformation of the former unions could be explained by several factors:
• they maintained their administrative and economy-wide organisational network, • they had more tradition, practice and skill in the field of negotiation on the national as well as on the firm level, • the new trade unions from the beginning have adopted a more conflictual strategy to fight the economic power of management of the former state-owned companies and later in the privatised firms, while the former unions, following their traditions, were more cooperative with management, putting more emphasis on the survival of the firm, • the conflictual strategy of the new unions did nőt fit with the privatisation intentions of the new political forces (which nőt so long before were founded and supported by the same new autonomous unions).
After the stabilisation of membership rates and the results of the repeated tests of legitimacy, the settlement of the redistribution of trade unión assets seemingly cooled down the rivalry. The tendency to fragmentation has stopped and a new period of concentrating unión efforts seems to have opened. This is expressed by increased coordination between different unión centres at national-level tripartite negotiations, and there are intentions of unification on the part of the smaller unión centres. Two influential centres, MSZOSZ and SZÉF, have concluded a strategic alliance to coordinate their actions. The employers as social partners are composed of very different groups, different in their social background, in economic weight, in their political influence and in their labour relations strategies. One important group of employers is formed by the managers of the remaining state-owned firms. The new entrepreneurs might be Hungarians or foreigners, buyers of once state-owned firms or smaller units, or even owners of newly established companies. They formed organisations according to the dimensions of their firms or according to the origin of their Capital. Small entrepreneurs and artisans have set up their own traditional associations. Multinational firms constitute another small bút rather influential group of employers.
In the National Council fór the Reconciliation of Interests, the employers' side is constituted by nine organisations: The multinationals have formed their own pressure group, a special association. It is nőt a participating member at the National Council fór Interest Reconciliation bút regularly meets key ministers and decision makers of the govemment.
Among the social partners the employers form the most heterogeneous side. Their interests, as well as their political influence, differ considerably according to the sector and dimensions of their firms. The unfinished privatisation is still keeping the employers' side in a fluid state. Their fragmented associations have fewer roots and traditions than the unión side has. Lacking coordination and similar or joint interests, they were regarded as the weakest social partners at the tripartite negotiations. Only recently were intentions of more coordination among them identified. The two largest associations, MGYOSZ and MMSZ, have agreed to cooperate more closely fór more efficient representation of employers' interests at national-level negotiations.
As to the strategies of the different employer groups in the field of labour relations, they are far from being homogeneous. The proprietors of small and medium-size enterprises are rather conservative and anti-unionist. They oppose the intervention of the state in employment relations. In many of the small and medium-size firms even minimum wage levels fixed at the national tripartite negotiations are nőt implemented. A great part of 'black labour', without legal regulations and guarantees, is employed in this sphere.
Employers and managers in the large plants already have the tradition of dialogue with the trade unions and of direct negotiations with the employees. In these firms (privatised completely or partially or still in state ownership) management is interested in maintaining consensus and cooperation with the unions. In certain cases in the remaining state-owned organisations management and unions have a common interest in obtaining more subventions, credits and investment from the govemment. (Fór example, the rather strong and annual strike activity at the National Railway Company-organised jointly by three different unions of the branch-represents pressure on the govemment to fináncé wage increases and technological development.)
Multinational companies, which might have come to Hungary by buying completely or partially state-owned firms or by 'green-field' investments, follow their own model of labour relations. This might be in certain cases anti-unionist, in others favourable to 'micro-corporatist structures' of firm-level communication and negotiation without the branch unions. The practice of labour relations in the Hungárián plants of these multinational companies is regarded as an intemational challenge by unions. The branch unión in the chemical sector, fór example, has already initiated intemational cooperation with the unions of the home countries of the different multinationals to establish common standards fór collective bargaining with the intemational management (on the different approach of multinational companies to labour relations see the Appendix).
Legal regulations and institutions
The most important source of labour legislation is the new Labour Code adopted by the freely elected Parliament in 1992. It completed the cumulative changes in the system of labour relations and set down the legal framework fór its key institutions:
• It legitimates the national-level institutions of interest conciliation (the NCRI, established in 1988).
• It lays down the rights and conditions of unión activities in firms.
• It defines the representativeness of the unions within the circumstances of the pluralistic unión movement.
• It regulates the conditions of collective bargaining and labour disputes.
• It establishes the institutions of Works Councils as a tool of employee participation and describes the conditions of their creation and their functions.
In this section we shall focus attention on collective bargaining and Works Councils as key institutions of Hungárián labour relations. Although collective agreements existed both on branch and firm level even before, collective bargaining had very limited meaning owing to the lack of autonomy and independence of the partners. The party-state regulated what should be settled in the collective agreements and the lack of autonomous partners made the bargaining process fictitious.
To analyse the specific features of collective bargaining in Hungary we distinguish two different types, both of which are playing an important role to reach a degree of consensus and somé form of more or less conflictual cooperation. The traditional and well known decision-making process created and maintained by the social partners of industrial relations in the field of employment-related issues (i.e. wages, working conditions, etc.) can be considered as the first type of collective bargaining. The second type is providing an institutional tool to build consensus on the principal orientations of the social and economic policy of the country. In Hungárián practice the National Council fór the Reconciliation of Interests as a tripartite body illustrates well this extended type of collective bargaining.
The new Labour Code has created a legal framework within which free bargaining can be possible between employers and employees. Fundamental changes characterise the content and the partners of collective bargaining. As to the content, the Labour Code sets a statutory minimum of employment conditions-collective agreements could provide more favourable conditions. The Labour Code recognises the trade unions' right to sign collective agreements at national, branch and firm levels. At one employer one collective agreement can be concluded. If there is only one union at a given employer to sign this agreement on the employees' side it should get more than 50% of the votes during Works Council elections. According to the Labour Code, a collective agreement might be signed by several unions at the same firm, presupposing that they have a common platform and obtained together more than 50% of the votes during Works Council elections. Unions having less than 10% at Works Council elections are nőt considered to be 'representative' negotiating partners. Employers at firm level should annually pút a draft collective agreement to the local one or more representative unions and this draft should include at least provisions on wages.
The role and influence of collective agreements are somewhat difficult to evaluate, fór several reasons. First, in the current unfavourable economic situation-after a deep recession since 1989 and amidst the high foreign and internál debts of the govemment-the partners have limited scope fór action. Second, neither the employ ers nor the unions have accumulated the necessary experience fór on-going bargaining. Third, successful bargaining would require the identification of the partners, which has nőt yet been completed among employers on the national and branch levels, mostly because the process of privatisation is nőt yet finished.
Managerial interests in agreements and in their contents might differ before and after privatisation and even according to the possible perspectives of privatisationwhether the firm is to be sold in different parts or as a whole, who are the expected new proprietors, whether management and/or employees might have a share in ownership of the future company, etc. These are all open questions that might influence most of the issues on the agenda during collective bargaining bút may be beyond the influence of the bargaining parties.
Other important dimensions are the levels and coverage rate of collective bargain ing. According to intemational experience (or at least the existing pattems of the OECD countries) the coverage rate of collective agreements concluded is generally higher than the average union density rate (Traxler, 1994) . As we have no statistics on the number of employees covered by accepted collective agreements we rely on estimates. In Hungary the norms and procedúrái dimensions fór branch and firm-level bargaining are set at national level in the Council fór the Reconciliation of Interests. This tripartite organ conducts the extended type of national level collective bargaining in which the social partners are consulted on macroeconomic strategies, social policy packages, taxation or the annual budget. The consultations are carried out at plenary sessions among representatives of the three social partners. The Council has special subcommittees to negotiate on different issues of employment, social policy, budgetary issues etc. The members of the unions' and employers' sides alsó have separate sessions to prepare their stand fór the plenary sessions. The Council itself has a small administration fór organising the consultations and communication between the social partners.
Evaluating the forms and levels of collective bargaining, we could say that economy-wide, branch (or meso) and firm-level collective bargaining are simul-taneously present in Hungárián labour relations practice (see Appendix Table A.6). Therefore it is impossible to use a generál coverage rate. According to the summary of the Phare Fact-Finding Committee the following coverage rates could reflect the influence of collective negotiations (Ladó & Tóth, 1995):
• Economy-wide agreements set the level of minimum wages in Hungary fór the whole community of wage eamers. (Since the establishment of the National Council fór the Reconciliation of Interests minimum wages were increased considerably, even if they could nőt keep up with rising prices and costs of living; see the Appendix.) Evaluating the performance of the plenary sessions of NCRI, these macro-level consultations might be said to have been dominated by issues conceming socio-economic policy: more than 50% of the items discussed belonged in this category. Questions of wages, working and employment conditions represented only 20% of the items, while vocational training policy accounted fór 10% of the items discussed at plenary meetings.
• Sectoral bargaining-or meso-level negotiations-were estimated to cover only 11% of employees, in 12 agreements.
• Firm/establishment level-or single-employer-bargaining is considered to be by far the dominant tendency in Hungary; 30-35% of the firms are covered by this level of collective bargaining in the competitive branches of the economy. This means that the number of employees covered by collective bargaining may be even higher.
Apart from the levels and coverage of collective bargaining it is worth noting the changes in the topics of labour disputes between employers and employees at firm level. Nowadays, besides the still important question of wages, we find privatisation, reorganisation of the firms and, connected to these issues, the problem of employment protection. Circumstances and procedures of redundancy have alsó moved intő the centre of labour disputes (Table 2) . Conceming the atmosphere of collective bargaining, the current feature of labour relations in Hungary is the cooperative approach between unions and management. To strengthen the cooperative pattems among the social partners a new institution of labour relations was set up in the summer of 1996; the National Service fór Reconciliation and Arbitration was founded to settle labour disputes in their very early phase and at their site of origin. This cooperative approach was nőt questioned even in cases of major cuts in the workforce and massive lay-offs. According to a survey by the Japanese Institute of Labour carried out in a large sample of Hungárián firms the majority of firm-level unions (99) have accepted and a significant number (64) have even supported cutbacks in employment. Only 20 local unions have declared their rejection of lay-offs at their plants (JIL, 1992) . No differences were found in this approach backing the reduction of employment between unions belonging to the different centres and confederations.
Another new key institution of Hungárián labour relations is the Works Councils. This represents a radical break with the pást, when trade unions' functions of representing employee interests and employee participation in managerial decisions were confused. The new Labour Code separates the main function of the unions, that is interest representation, participation in collective bargaining and organisation of collective action, from the participation of employees. 'Participatory rights are exercised in the employees' name by the Works Council or work delegates elected by them' (Labour Code, 1992, eh. IV, Para. 42).
Works Councils have to be elected at every work piacé where the number of employees is above 50 by secret ballot from among the candidates nominated by unions or other groups of employees. (In smaller organisations, bút with more than 15 employees, work delegates should be elected.) The Works Councils (and delegates) are elected fór a three-year period and are aimed at developing social norms and rules fór long-term conflict solution. They have three types of rights:
(1) To give and refuse consent to the allocation of the social welfare funds and the utilisation of social facilities and reál estate of their firms specified in the collective agreements. Beside this type of joint decisions an agreement has to be reached between management and the Works Council on labour health and safety regulations too. (2) To be informed of and asked to comment on a broad rangé of issues (i.e. drafts of measures that have an impact on a large segment of employees, like the reorganisation of the firm, privatisation, mergers, vocational training, career development, etc.). (3) The employer has the obligation to inform the Works Councils at least every six months about the principal factors affecting business, trends in employment and in wages, major decisions conceming production and investment.
These participatory rights of the Works Councils are regarded as more limited than the earlier participatory rights of the former unions, namely the rights of the shop stewards' bodies in the 1970s and 1980s. In the early 1990s there was a fear that such rights would interfere with 'free bargaining' and would conflict with the rights of the emerging priváté owners and employers.
T h e rig h ts-in c lu d in g c o -d e c isio n s , c o n s u lta tio n s a n d in fo rm a tio n -o f th e B o d y o f S h o p S te w a rd s in re a lity w e re e q u a l to th e stro n g in s titu tio n o f w o r k e rs ' p a rtic ip a tio n in W e s t E u ro p e a n C o u n trie s (i.e. G e rm á n W o rk s C o u n c ils ). In th is p e rs p e c tiv e , th e rig h ts o f sh o p ste w a rd s c o u ld h a v e b e e n tra n s fe rre d to rig h ts o f th e n e w W o rk s C o u n c ils w ith o u t c re a tin g se rio u s p ro b le m s fó r th e e m e rg in g m a rk é t e c o n o m y a n d p riv á té e m p lo y e rs. B ú t th e n ew la b o u r re g u lá d o n d id c u rta il c o n s id e ra b le th e p a rtic ip a tio n rig h ts o f tra d e u n io n s-a n d in g e n e rá l th e rig h ts o f tra d e u n io n s-a n d Evén the initial intentions of legislators to separate the representative functions of trade unions from direct employee participation (similarly to the Germán model) were nőt completely successful. Owing to the several tests of legitimacy and to the obligation to redistribute former union assets according to the results of the Works Council elections, trade unions were forced to 'occupy' these institutions. We do nőt yet have enough experience to judge how well delegates in the Works Council can separate their participation from the bargaining activity of their unions.
Participation as a characteristic feature o f Hungárián labour relations
The various components and institutions of the Hungárián labour relations system have developed unevenly over the pást decades. Nőne of the three areas-creation of national-level tripartite or bipartite negotiations, institutionalisation of collective bargaining, and labour disputes-were tolerated in the logic of the monolithic political system that lasted until the end of the 1980s. While there always existed the need to create social consent at workplace level that favoured the development of various forms of employees' participation in Hungary, the motives were very different, ranging from management's interest in cooperation with ránk and file people, the adaptation and spread of new managerial techniques, to the ideologically motivated aims of workplace humanisation with special emphasis on identification with the firm, or to the politically motivated attempts to introduce so-called selfmanagement schemes to counterbalance the growing managerial power. (These last-mentioned intentions were especially visible in the 1980s, designed to keep political control over the emerging technocrats, local or branch level union bureaucracies often in coalition with managers of the firms, who succeeded in influencing the redistribution processes in directions contrary to the efforts of the national political actors.) The concepts to implement these counterbalancing solutions and the life-span o f the different participation schemes were objects of interplay between different social forces on firm and national level. Both forms of employee participation, direct and representative (indirect), were widespread in Hungárián practice. The most important direct forms were in experiments with autonomous working units, group-level decisions on wage distribution, group-based cost-reduction centres, internál subcontracting systems, and especially in the widespread and highly publicised economic working associations (VGMK) of the 1980s. The growing role of union representation, expressed in the different shop steward and firm-level union committee rights since the middle of the 1970s, together with the creation of the Enterprise Councils as self-goveming bodies in the second half of the 1980s, was the most significant development of indirect participation. The unions, having gradually obtained their participating and bargaining rights, were anxious when they saw other direct forms of employee participation and non-union representation being initiated. They were afraid of losing their newly acquired functions (of the 1970s) in employee representation, which was a well known phenomenon of the labour relations systems in the industrialised countries. In Hungary their position was more troublesome as they were still in a politically dependent position till 1989 and they felt threatened more by non-union controlled representation and direct participatory forms or new managerial techniques to create direct communication with employees.
Research shows that in Hungary employee participation has been a key element of labour relations since the 1970s. In its different forms, it partially replaced the autonomous institution of collective bargaining and labour disputes and, together with informál mechanisms of interest conciliation, contributed to the stability and flexibility of the labour process and created a lasting practice of cooperation between the partners at firm level (Ishikawa, 1992) . The tight labour markét situation and organisational problems generated by the shortage economy strengthened the informál power of certain working groups playing a key role in solving them. The enlarged possibilities of participation at firm level since the 1970s helped certain employee groups to accumulate important social skills in evaluating and manipulating social and organisational situations, in negotiating with different social partners and in elaborating overall views of the enterprises and their environment. The same experience called attention to the limits of participation and showed which missing elements of the labour relations system hindered the wider and more efficient use of firm-level participatory schemes.
Since 1988-89 the innovations of the renewed autonomous labour relations system became especially important in the situation of sweeping changes in the Hungárián economy, when property relations went through a comprehensive transformation, public firms were privatised and a new priváté sector developed, decentralisation of former large organisations was carried out, and a deep economic recession damaged almost all spheres of the economy. In the circumstances of these unstable economic conditions and the huge social costs of transformation paid by large groups, the new elements of labour relations helped to maintain stability and sometimes even to resolve critical situations of unrest.
At first glancé, after the transformation, participation on the firm level seemed to lose its importance. Somé observers expected (and still expect) the importance of firm-level negotiations and bargaining (in formai or informál ways) to diminish under the pressure of the new phenomenon of high unemployment. Others expect that priváté property and capitalist management will 'import' the well known managerial methods and techniques of firm-level negotiations fór 'manufacturing consent' (Poór, 1994) .
Apart from these assumptions-which we shall attempt to refute later-the piacé of participation in the Hungárián labour relations system has certainly changed. First of all, it has lost its political and ideological significance-local employer-employee conflicts can hardly be transposed intő basic social contradictions. Its functions connected to firm-level issues became more circumscribed. Meanwhile the social and political positions of the partners were altered at firm level by the appearance of direct priváté property, the definite disappearance of the 'mythologies' of work and the 'eláss approach', the declining production because of the deepening recession, and the new institutions and legal possibilities to influence decisions or protest at firm level. It would, however, over-simplify the situation to conclude that new rights were acquired by employees in a historical period when they lost their reál bargaining strength under the pressure of the labour markét and the recession.
Employee groups in a strong position within firms can still be found, despite dismissals and unemployment. Even with increased unemployment, productivity declined until 1993, demonstrating the survival of low work requirements. The high social costs of transformation and the lowering of living standards have been tolerated without major political unrest and the strike rate has been low in the pást few years. Somé strikes have been desperate revolts against 'non-cooperative' management of workers in marginal sectors and positions, while others have been mounted by powerful employee groups in order to improve their pay and working conditions.
A view widely accepted among labour relations experts is that, in periods of recession, when unemployment increases, the number of strikes diminishes. This is taken to be a sign of the weak bargaining positions of employees and their unions. In this respect, Hungary seems to be no exception. While in the 1980s there were widespread fears among Hungárián (and other Central and East European) political and social scientists that a fali in living standards accompanied by a retreat from full employment would lead to social unrest, this has nőt been the case in these first years of the transformation. Unemployment, never known after World War II, rose to a rate of 14-15% in 1993 and then diminished slightly to the present 12-13%. The number of strikes and their participants, despite a considerable increase in 1995, have remained low in Hungary, thereby testifying to the validity of the above 'rule' on the lower level of open and manifest conflict attributable to the weakened bargaining positions of workers still in employment. In Hungary, where the majority of the jobless are long-term unemployed and hundreds of thousands are in casual employ ment, those who managed to keep their jobs in the first waves of lay-offs and workplace closures are considered necessary fór the stabilisation and possible recovery of their firms.
In several case studies (Makó & Simonyi, 1995) one can find very different experiences conceming direct participation and informál bargaining of employees, according to the various organisational and managerial settings. In a large Steel plánt, fór example, where collective bargaining was less successful fór the employees, they withdrew from participation in problem solving and quality control. Bút in the declining textile sector we found a case where workers who were engaged in very conflictual strikes in the same period regularly participated in solving the technological and organisational difficulties of their plánt. Participation may express deep and long-term interests of the employees in the survival of their firms even in times of labour disputes, bút it may nőt replace successful collective bargaining. In Hungárián labour relations practice the institution of participation used to be and seems to remain a possibility fór the social partners to express their intentions, to communicate, to revise and prepare collective bargaining or to prevent collective disputes. It used to and continues to offer a certain flexibility to the system of labour relations.
As a new element of the transformed Hungárián labour relations we have already mentioned the W ork's Councils as institutions representing all employees of a workplace. Their predecessors have appeared in several different revolutionary periods in Hungary, in 1918 Hungary, in -19, between 1945 Hungary, in and 1948 Hungary, in , in 1956 , as institutions to ensure workers' control while management's influence has been weakened. Despite obvious differences in social, economic and historical circumstances there are several common institutional features in their reappearance and functioning:
(1) W orkers' councils were created in revolutionary situations when traditional institutions of political democracy were paralysed and radical changes in property relations created a vacuum and instability in management. (2) This form of workers' self management aimed to integrate the contradictory roles of employers and employees. It sought to defend the interest of employees (like any classical union) and take over management's responsibility too in organising production. In 1919 fór example, workers' councils had to deal with keeping labour discipline, defending the socialised form of property and controlling production. (3) These councils never limited their activities to the firm level, bút sought to establish ties both horizontally and vertically, with the ambition of gaining political control over the country's economy-partly because of their political ambitions bút alsó to stabilisé new political, social and managerial institutions (Varga, 1990; Szalai, 1995) .
The present Works Councils were nőt created with these ambitious aims. Besides participation in interest representation and bargaining through the unions, the present form of Works Council can be regarded as an institution fór employee participation. Their mandatory system has certain similarities to countries (like Germany or Austria) with a so-called dual system of labour relations. Works Councils are expected to develop social norms and rules of the game fór long-term conflict resolution among the social partners at firm level. The outcome of these rules might foster or enhance cooperation between employers and employees and among their different groups. Mention should finally be made of a new emerging element of employee partici pation as a social product of spreading innovative managerial techniques in the field of humán resource management (HRM). In the vacuum of labour relations immediately after the political transformation the need fór everyday communication and problem solving placed a particular value on direct relations between managerial and employees' groups. Beside that, the transfer of Western managerial skills and systems is one of the most visible and urgent challenges fór the Hungárián economic elite owing to the growing influence of W estern and multinational firms. Spreading forms of teamwork, ie a n ' and 'flatter' organisations with reduced numbers of hierarchical levels, establishing more 'heterarchic relations' within organisations, reorganisation of firms' newspapers and bulletins, and group discussions are all on the list of new managerial initiatives.
Privatisation, production decentralisation, the crisis of the redistribution mechanisms, the narrowing possibilities of 'concession policy', the pluralisation of em ployee and employer organisations separately and together constitute the challenge fór labour relations. Nőt by chance have the social partners been urging a 'social pact' since 1990. The aborted attempt in 1995-in our interpretation-is revealing as to the present state of labour relations: on the national level the political framework of labour relations and the position of the main actors seem to be stabilised, while on the firm level labour relations are shaped by forces following different rationalities of their own very diversified product, Capital and labour markets as well as the different cultural pattems of their everyday actions. These two tendencies of the mid-1990s made the pact unnecessary and superfluous.
Apart from the outcome of this attempt to create the social pact, from time to time one can witness at national level the need to stabilisé social relations through centralised agreements. Bút at firm level, despite the relatively high unemployment rate and economic recession, high quality performance, problem solving and adaptivity cannot be obtained only through Central agreements. Cooperation between employ ers and different employee groups is based on economically motivated collaboration and nőt on institutionalised and/or ideologically motivated social obligations. That leads, even without public intervention, to 'micro-cooperativism' (Streeck, 1988) constituted by the rational self-interest of the social partners conceming employment, wages, qualifications and working conditions. When, on the managerial side, quality, adaptivity and problem solving, and on the other side employee interests related to working conditions and prospects are achieved, these results may distinguish cooperativism from passivity attributable to weak bargaining positions. This tendency, described in the highly developed countries in the pást decade, can be identified in somé dynamic spheres of the Hungárián economy as well. Thus, within the system of labour relations very heterogeneous firm-level configurations as a consequence of the multiform presence of participation are acquiring decisive importance. The unified central pattems of labour relations are important in setting a stabilised political background and norms fór the relationship of the social partners, bút their role in orienting firm-level labour relations should nőt be overestimated.
Summary
At the present state of developments we would refrain from classifying the Hungárián system with any of the existing labour relations models (like corporative or antagonistic, centralised or decentralised, Northern or Southern, European versus Asian, etc.) Bút we would like to take over a few categories from the intemational literature to characterise the approach and the strategies of the social partners as well as the structure and functioning of the emerging Hungárián labour relations.
(1) W ith the present property and organisational structure of the economy the national-level tripartite negotiations gained special importance. This sort of centralisation of negotiations between the social partners has been based on the already existing, however limited, mechanisms of national-level interest conciliation. The practice of national-level tripartism proved to be advantageous during the politically and socially conflictual period of the transformation. Bút the centralised character of that very visible institution of labour relations cannot be generalised fór the whole system. The property relations and the dimensions of economic organisations are far more heterogeneous, and closer analysis of labour relations in their everyday practice reveals diversified mechanisms and solutions in employment relations. The relatively low coverage rate of collective bargaining on branch and firm levels illustrates well the limited impact of the centralised negotiations, especially in work and employment-related issues. (2) In our analysis we attributed special importance to employee participation in all forms, in its legal institutions, in informál ways and within the techniques of Humán Resource Management. With the creation of the Works Councils-even if they have at present limited rights-labour legislation created a dual structure of labour relations. Within this dual structure trade unions are actors in representing employee interests, while employees can become partners in firm-level decision making in the Works Councils. Collective bargaining and collective actions organised by the unions are tools to ensure cooperation and to solve conflicts from time to time in the short run, while the various forms of employee participation set down the rules and pattems of lasting cooperation between the social partners. The Labour Code, by the creation of the Works Council, gave an institutional framework to this later ambition. (3) This present period of transformation has led to rather controversial observations conceming employment relations. Even in a worsening situation on the labour markét the bargaining power of certain employee groups has increased. In spite of the high social costs of restructuring, the level of conflictuality remained relatively low. Even at a time of national-level disputes between the social partners on macroeconomic issues, on the firm level unions are working together with management to solve organisational, employment or humán consequences of the transformation. A longitudinal study on the identification of employees with unions and with management in the very competitive electronic and electrical industries revealed quite close levels of loyalty to both categories of actors at firm level, a phenomenon called 'double loyalty ' (Makó & Novoszáth, 1996) . Bút the national-level agreements and the firm-level cooperation between the partners do nőt automatically offer universal coverage fór Hungárián labour. The labour relations system is fragmented; unemployed people, employees in small and medium-size firms, the growing number of seasonal and temporary employees, etc., representing a very significant part (if nőt the majority) of the Hungárián labour force are nőt under the 'umbrella' of the labour relations system. (4) The intensified intemationalisation of the Hungárián economy since the trans formation is leading to various consequences in the system of labour relations. The intemational trend of the 'decline in the political influence and economic bargaining power of labour due to the mobility of Capital and fixity of labour' (Flecker, 1994, p. 93) can be experienced in Hungary too, where the presence of multinational corporations in the manufacturing sector is extremely strong. The so-called greenfield manufacturing accounts fór about 15% of the Hungárián GDP now. To cope with the challenge of globalisation, unions eager to develop new and innovative approaches are in an unfavourable position compared to Capital utilising heterogeneous, flexible and individualised forms of employment and capable of high intemational mobility. The Hungárián unions are now coping with the consequences of restructuring ownership, of organisational and sectoral changes within the context of globalisation. These changes are forcing them to shift their attention from seeking extemal (political-ideological) legitimation to internál legitimation through, fór example, stronger campaigns fór the acceptance of EU labour standards or by recruiting members from new target groups (like women, part-time employees, young people, service sector employees, etc.).
Hungary, together with the other Central and East European countries, had to face several types of pressure to create or build up social institutions based on different types of social and economic regulations and developed in different historical contexts. After World W ar II the monolithic model of Soviet-type labour relations had to be adopted without any respect fór the useful elements of the pre-war Hungárián system. Following the collapse of the socialist-type political and economic régimé and the creation of new institutions in the field of labour relations, many advocates of transformation rejected ideas of possible recombination of any old and new elements. At the beginning of the 1990s we saw a strong wish fór 'institutional imitation' even in this field. The importance of participation, the existence of cooperative pattems, the so-called 'double loyalty' were nőt taken intő consideration and were classified as informál elements of a former, nőt yet autonomous labour relations system. Behind pure theories the everyday practice of labour relations is however more 'opportunistic' in following those pattems that pro ved to be successful fór the interests of the social partners, leading thus to interesting combinations of 'old' and 'new' actors and institutions, new legal regulations and traditions. The outcome of interest conciliation in the long run can definitely legitimate the new actors and institutions of labour relations at national level as well as at the workplace. S t a t u t o r y M i n i m u m W a g e i n H u n g a r y , 1 9 8 8 -1 9 9 5
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